On 9 November 2026 the CNIL announced ten simplified-procedure sanctions, with fines from €3,000 to €20,000, aimed at French local authorities and a public body. Its findings under GDPR Article 32 include no multifactor authentication for administrators, and external providers with permanent network access or shared accounts. If you run privileged accounts or let suppliers into your network, those findings are an audit checklist.

The CNIL ties the batch to its 2025 control theme of local-authority cybersecurity, where it inspected several authorities and their providers. It says €20,000 is the legal maximum for this procedure, and that amounts reflect the number and gravity of failings, the data involved (minors’ data, bank details), each body’s budget and the remedial steps taken. This time the CNIL issued fines, not only formal notices, and says other proceedings are under way.

Two of the findings deserve a precise reading. The first is remote authentication that was not strong enough for staff with elevated privileges, with “no multifactor authentication for administrators” as the CNIL’s example. The second is that some external providers, such as software vendors, had permanent network access that was not authorised case by case, or ran through accounts shared among several employees. Those are two separate failings, and you can have one without the other.

Do not over-read the announcement. The CNIL page names no sanctioned body and gives no per-body fine, so nobody outside the decisions can say which finding drove which amount. What the batch shows is the CNIL’s expectations for privileged and third-party access, and that it is now issuing fines in this area.

What Article 32 says, and what the CNIL applied it to

Article 32 asks controllers and processors for technical and organisational measures appropriate to the risk. As we read the text of Article 32(1), it lists examples such as pseudonymisation and encryption and regular testing of the effectiveness of measures; it does not name MFA, shared accounts or the location of your staff. The CNIL applied Article 32 to these failings: unprotected remote administrator logins and open-ended supplier access.

The CNIL has a published recommendation on MFA (deliberation 2025-019 of 20 March 2025) that covers strict authentication only, not account management or rights. It also addresses SMS one-time codes and employees’ personal devices as a possession factor, so read it before you decide what counts as a second factor on your estate. Your admin MFA requirements should come from that text, not from a vendor’s checklist.

A remote access security audit in six checks

You can run this in a week with read access to your directory, your VPN or bastion configuration, and your supplier contracts.

  1. Inventory privileged accounts. List every account with administrative rights on servers, network gear, hypervisors, databases and cloud consoles, including break-glass accounts and service accounts that a human can log into.
  2. Test MFA on every privileged login path. The CNIL flagged remote authentication, notably for teleworkers, so test the remote path first: VPN, bastion, web console and direct SSH or RDP. One path that skips the second factor is the path an attacker uses.
  3. Find shared accounts. Search for logins used by more than one person, especially supplier accounts shared across a vendor’s support team. Replace them with named accounts, so a log line points to a person.
  4. End permanent supplier access. For each external provider, ask who authorised the access, for which task, and when it expires. Access that is off by default and opened case by case, with an end date, answers the CNIL’s wording directly.
  5. Check that logs are reviewed. The CNIL also found incomplete logging and no real-time or short-term review. Logging administrative actions is half the control; someone or something has to read the log within a short window.
  6. Look at the neighbours. The same decisions cite insufficient segmentation, unmaintained operating systems, and weak, clear-text or poorly stored passwords. A supplier account that lands on a flat network is a bigger problem than one that lands in a segment.

A shared supplier account is a login where the audit log cannot tell you who did what.

How we run administrative access ourselves

We operate our four datacenters, MAD1, AMS1, MUN1 and HEL1, ourselves. The facility operators provide space, power and cooling; the network and the transit are ours, and so is the question of who can administer anything. Only authorised DIVERSITY staff located in the EU can reach the infrastructure, and administrative access is logged and needs multi-factor authentication.

This is our own practice and a sovereignty measure, not a CNIL finding; nothing in the CNIL’s announcement imposes EU-located staff, and as we read it Article 32 does not either. We cite it as the shape of an answer to your checks 2 and 5, not as proof that the same control will satisfy a regulator for your estate.

The customer side is yours to design. If you run workloads with us, you decide who gets accounts on your instances, and managed single sign-on (IAM/SSO) and managed Active Directory run in all four sites, so you can manage named accounts through either in whichever site you choose. For a vendor that supports software on your servers, the usual answer is a named account that you open for a task and close afterwards.

The French-specific findings and the NIS2 horizon

Some findings are specific to France. Several decisions note that information systems lacked the security approval (homologation) that the RGS requires before going live, and several authorities were sanctioned over missing DPIAs for school and after-school services and public-space video surveillance. If you are outside French public administration, those two items are context, not your checklist.

The horizon matters more. IT Social reads NIS2 Article 21 as citing supply-chain security and the use of MFA; that is a press reading, so check the Article 21 text itself before you rely on it. The CNIL says France is still transposing NIS2, which will bring new IT-security requirements to local authorities, and that it devotes half of its 2026 controls and enforcement to data security, so expect more decisions like these.

What to do before the next batch

Start with checks 2 and 4, because they map to the two findings the CNIL gave as examples. Write down, per privileged account and per supplier, the evidence you would hand an inspector: the MFA policy, the authorisation record, the expiry date and the log review. If the evidence takes more than a day to assemble, you have found the real finding.

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